We present a conceptual framework that introduces key concepts capturing initial trust establishment in on-demand Virtual Organisations (VO). This framework can be used to develop trust formation protocols and policies. The framework can serve as a basis for implementing an automated system that facilitates the establishment of a VO, considerably reduces the effort for setting up a VO and consequently reduces the VO's time to operation. A novel aspect of the initial trust establishment described in this paper is the consideration of the mutual trust effects of the participants' behaviour during the trust negotiation process.
Introduction
Business networks are evolving into VOs consisting of independent service providers that combine resources to exploit a particular market opportunity. Establishing trust between VO participants is the basis for successful collaboration and joint performance. However, the dynamic, temporal and often competitive nature of VOs presents substantial challenges to trust formation (Ishaya and Mundy, 2004) . Furthermore, the lack of face-to-face communication and often-insufficient information about VO participants inhibits traditional trust building techniques. Research on trust formation in communication environments such as VOs, grids, and the semantic web is in its early stages (Almenarez et al., 2004; Cardoso and Oliveira, 2004; Davulcu et al., 1999; Dellarocas et al., 2002; Grefen et al., 2000; Periorellis and Parastatidis, 2005; Rocha and Oliveira, 2001; Tagg and Quirchmayr, 2001) . This paper considers initial negotiation that involves two participants wishing to establish a VO. For example, consider two companies (that have never cooperated before) wishing to establish a VO for a commercial collaboration, such as computer assembly. One of them produces desktops, the other one manufactures monitors. Both parties are interested in maximising their share of the profits on the end product sales. In order to commit to a joint venture, the companies have to establish initial trust. The trust building process is comprised of two stages: goal verification and agreement negotiation. First each party needs to decide whether the trade-off between risk and expected return is acceptable. The parties must agree on a common goal (product assembly) and verify that incentives are in place to achieve this goal (the end product consists of resources that belong to each company). Next, the parties need to negotiate a mechanism to share the profit. During the negotiations, parties exchange offers (agreement proposals) and counter-offers until the agreement is reached (initial trust is established) or failure is reported. While the agreement enforcement is a vital part of the VO infrastructure, the discussion of the monitoring and enforcing mechanisms is outside of the scope of this paper. We do not consider trust evolution during the operation of the established VO.
Our framework can be used to develop trust formation protocols and policies. The framework can serve as a basis for implementing an automated system that facilitates the establishment of a VO, considerably reduces the effort for setting up a VO and consequently reduces the VO's time to operation.
During the formation of a VO, participants have a choice of service providers with whom they may cooperate. Each party must decide whether it is willing to engage in a business relationship with the other party. During the initial phase, when parties become aware of each other, trust is at its most fragile state: individual's tentative trust assumptions could be easily destroyed by one's early beliefs. In the period after the initial one -the continuing relationship -the parties interact and their judgements about each other become a function of the interactions themselves (McKnight et al., 1998) .
Trust exists in the context where there are benevolent and malicious behaviour and risks involved in trusting the other party Josang, 1996; Josang and Presti, 2004) . In order to establish trust, the parties must exhibit interdependence: one party is not able to fulfill its function or achieve its objectives without action by the other party. In this situation, each party desires assurance that the other's actions will enable their interdependent objectives to be met. The initial trust formation process consists of the two phases:
• goal verification: the participants must agree on a mutually beneficial goal in order to justify a VO creation and confirm interdependence -a necessary precondition of trust
• agreement negotiation to determine and agree on what constitutes benevolent/malicious behaviour and how to reach the goal.
Although trust formation is essential, it is not sufficient for the prevention and detection of fraudulent transactions. Sanctions are used for enforcement of benevolent behaviour. It is difficult to give an exact definition of trust due to its complex subjective nature. However, we believe that trust in VOs can be explicitly modelled using four constructs: expectations, obligations, agreements and suspicion levels.
In our model, trust reflects intention of an entity a to accept vulnerability/risks based on positive expectations of the intentions of entity b to fulfill commitments (obligations), demonstrate honesty in negotiations and refrain from excessive advantage. Obligations represent the participant's commitment to provide a service under certain terms and conditions to other participant. The concept of an agreement is used to make an explicit declaration of the expected and malicious behaviour defined in the participants' obligations, and sanctions in the case of non-conformance to the obligations. When agreement is reached, the initial trust is established. By the initial trust we mean the decision of both parties to accept the risks and willingness to participate in alliance. Trust may change in the course of VO interactions.
The framework represents trust in a manner that captures human intuition, such that positive outcomes of interactions preserve or amplify trust, while trust erodes with negative experiences. Distrust (or suspicion level) specifies a means of revoking previously established trust based on observed behaviour. Parties tend to confirm their early belief that the other party is trustworthy or not by evaluating the other's actions and attributing them to the benevolent/malicious behaviours (Falcone and Castelfranchi, 2004) . The suspicion level is determined by monitoring the 'lack of goodwill' that appears as signs of non-cooperation and the partner's proactively opportunistic behaviours during the trust establishment process.
A novel aspect of the initial trust establishment considered in this paper is monitoring the participant's behaviour during the agreement negotiation process and adjusting trust values based on the perceived behaviour. By modelling the agreement negotiation in this way, the relationship between the trust, initial participants' behaviour, expectations, obligations and agreements become more readily apparent for future VO work.
Key concepts
To model the trust establishing phase between two entities a and b, we consider the following structures:
• participants a and b that wish to create a VO
• suspicion levels sl a and sl b attributed to the participants a and b
• mutual goal G
• negotiation history H a,b maintained locally by the participants a and b
• agreement A between a and b.
The next sections briefly describe each structure.
Participants
We think of participants as consisting of resources R, attributes SV, actions X, and local policies I:
Set R : R = {r i } represents humans, physical resources, services, information, products that a member contributes to VO according to a negotiated agreement. Set S : S = {s j } represents requested attributes that a participant must prove. Set SV : SV = {sv k } represents verified (proved) attributes, such as identity, competence, technical knowledge, skills, that a participant must prove to the other party. In the implementation, these attributes are supported by digital certificates issued by trusted authorities that prove the possession of the attributes.
Set X : I = {x l } denotes actions that must be performed on the resources (e.g., ship product parts before a deadline). The actions can be conditioned on time, location or other context.
Set I : I = {i m } denotes the participant's local policies that express the participant's interests and set of private goals. The policies can, for example, represent the workload acceptance levels (together with their agreed prices); include both a minimum desired production output (under which a partner's participation may not be profitable anymore) and a maximum committed contribution to the VO.
VO participants cooperate to achieve specific objectives/goals not otherwise possible separately by performing a sequence of goal-directed actions (Plan). The goal G determines the intended objective of the VO -the purpose of the collaboration, expressed as a set of rules that specify how the objective can be met. Agreeing on a common goal serves as a pre-condition of trust. Typically, the ultimate goal of VOs is to create value (utility) to shareholders through selling an end product F (either goods or services). For the interdependence to exist, the end product must represent a composition of services/resources (R a , R b ) that belong to each participant (a and b):
E represents expectations -a wish list comprising of a set of obligations that the other entity should undertake as part of the agreement. O represents obligations an entity would be willing to enter into under an agreement with another participant. A member commits itself to provide a service under certain terms and conditions to another member. An obligation may represent demanded workload for each participant, resources to be contributed, required prices for each participant's contribution, profit distribution, etc.
Set W : W = {w m } denotes sanctions. Deviation from prescribed behaviours may be admitted and properly addressed through sanctions that are enforced by the agreement enforcement mechanisms. Obligations include at least one sanction in case of non-performance; otherwise, the obligations might be ineffective.
Obligations and expectations are expressed as a set of Boolean formulas over declarative statements making explicit the expected pattern of the participants' interactions.
Each statement describes whether the statement imposes an action that must be taken by another member in the federation and a set of sanctions w i (w i is in W) that will be carried out in case of non-performance, or whether the statement is a predicate that must be met, and exception activity taken if it is not met. The statements are described in terms of:
• resources/services (set R) that are expected from the other party or must be contributed to the party
• attributes (set S) that the participant or other VO members must prove
• specific actions (set X), which a member has to perform on its own, or other members' resources.
The first step is the goal verification process. During this step the participants must agree on a mutually beneficial goal by exchanging the goal verification messages GV. Each member a must verify that the goal G is aligned with the participants' private interests I a and that incentives are in place to achieve the goal G. For the interdependence to exist, the end product must represent a composition of services/resources (R a , R b ) that belong to each participant (a and b). To achieve this, the participants must (at least partially) reveal their utilities/capabilities R a and R b .
During the agreement negotiation phase, the participants have to agree on a mechanism to share the utility. A participant a enters a negotiation with a participant b with an agreement proposal P a,b :
The agreement proposal consists of the following:
• expectations E a,b expressed as a set of Boolean formulas We define the rules from the point of view of a. We omitted the similar set of rules defined from the point of view of b for brevity.
Set I represents policies that control the goal validation and agreement negotiation processes. These policies are conditioned on suspicion levels. The local policies I of a participant include the following rule sets: In general, the obligations that fulfill expectations can be defined as a 'superset' of the expectations. For example, consider a user expectation "computational resources must be available no <4 h in any 24 h period". Then any obligation that guarantees resource availability over 4 hours per day fulfils the expectation. sl ′ Even though the participating parties may have no prior knowledge of one another, some characteristics (e.g., geographic location, communications mechanisms, etc.) relevant to the type of the agreement being negotiated contribute to the initial trust in the participant. These characteristics are specified in local policies I and are used for calculating the suspicion level. For example, when negotiating the QoS guarantees with a remote participant behind a slow connection, we might be more suspicious about unrealistically high QoS guarantees proposed by the participant, than when negotiating with a participant behind a high speed connection.
During the negotiation process, each participant observes the flow of offers and counter-offers and according to the rules expressed in local policies I, adjusts the suspicion level for the negotiating party if a suspicious behaviour is detected.
Suspicion Levels (SLs)
Initial trust is expressed as conformance of participants to normative negotiation behaviours described in the participants' policy I. SLs indicate perceived deviation from the expected behaviour. The values are derived from interaction histories H, allowing the estimation of likely future behaviours. Each suspicion level sl a is attributed to a particular member a and is represented by a vector:
Each component i a sl is attributed to a particular type of suspicion. For example, 1 a sl may asses likelihood of sensitive information leaks by asking other participants to reveal sensitive attributes that may be unrelated to the nature of agreement (e.g., asking for company's list of clients or internal organisational structure when negotiating a profit share). Investigating the behavioural aspects to be monitored and policies that guide the Suspicion Level adjustment are areas for further research.
sl min represents strong belief that the participant a is acting in accordance to the normative behaviour, sl max represents strong belief that the participant a is acting in contrary to the expected or desired behaviour. The SL increases with the occurring times of the suspicious event and decreases when a 'positive' event happens. The value by which the SL is increased (or decreased) depends on the confidence level that the repeated event indicates malicious (or positive) activity. 
Negotiation history

Each participant maintains a history H of interactions with the negotiating party that consists of a set of negotiation rounds
.
Trust formation example
Consider the example given in the Introduction section that illustrates an agreement negotiation between two enterprises a and b wishing to establish a VO for joint computer assembly. a produces desktops, b manufactures monitors. Each participant defines the minimum profit share it is willing to accept in its local policies I. This information is secret and is not revealed to the other party.
Goal verification
In this example the goal G:
desktop monitor ship monitor r r Plan x r Γ = =
is to get profit from selling a computer (end product) R that is composed of a desktop produced by a and a monitor that must be supplied by b. Assume that the plan to achieve the goal G consists of b shipping the monitor to a. Assume that a initiates a negotiation by sending a message to b that contains an invitation to create a VO to achieve the goal:
When b receives this message, it first verifies the goal by making sure that G is aligned with b's private interests expressed in policies I b and that the goal is achievable. If, for example, the end product has to include some software r = {r desktop , r monitor , r software }, then the goal can not be achieved by the efforts of a and b alone. They would either have to find an additional partner to form a virtual team or change the goal. Assume that the goal verification succeeds: 
At this point the participants agreed on a mutually beneficial goal and confirmed the interdependence. During the agreement negotiation phase, the participants have to agree on a mechanism to share the profit.
Agreement negotiation Round 1
Assume that a initiates a negotiation by sending a message to b that contains the first version of an agreement proposal:
The proposal contains:
a b ship monitor penalty E x r w = for b to ship a monitor and a sanction -specified penalty w penalty in the case of non-performance
to give b 20% of the profit
• the quality assurance requirement s b that b needs to prove to a in order to satisfy the compatibility and quality requirements posed by a on b's product.
The proposal contains an empty set of a's verified credentials.
When b receives a's proposal, it first calculates the suspicion level sl a attributed to a. Since prior interactions between a and b are limited to just the goal verification process, the sl a is set to a default value . b checks whether the proposed obligations and expectations fulfill its own requirements. Since a proposed lower profit share than b expects, the fulfill function returns false. Assume that b accepts the requested sanction w penalty .
Next b generates a counter-proposal 1 , .
a b P The proposal indicates that:
• b is willing to supply the monitor if a commits to the profit share of 60%
• b agrees to pay a penalty w penalty if b does not perform on time
• a will be a subject to legal sanction w sanction if a does not provide the agreed profit share.
Next b sends the counter-offer and its certification sv b to a. 
Rounds 2-N When a receives b's counter-offer, a notices that b's profit expectation is higher than the minimum profit specified in a's local policies I a (which indicates the minimum profit of 50%), and makes a counter offer setting b's profit to a lower value. The negotiation proceeds in a similar fashion until the agreement is reached. If b is acting suspiciously, for example, constantly exhibiting opportunistic behaviour by not lowering its profit expectation (or even rising the profit expectation each new round), a will increase the suspicion level sl b . This behaviour is not necessarily malicious, it is natural for one to wish for a higher profit. However, a can infer that b is likely trying to probe the maximum profit share that a can offer, which is a sign of 'lack of good will'. Such behaviour may indicate potential future problems in the collaboration with b.
When sl b reaches certain threshold (defined in the policies I a ), a may decide not to establish the agreement with b (by sending a negotiation failure message to b) and find a more cooperative partner for the collaboration.
Implementation considerations
In this section we briefly describe infrastructures supporting the framework. In previous work, we developed an Adaptive Trust Negotiation and Access Control (ATNAC) framework (Ryutov et al., 2005) to address issues of access control in open systems. We are applying these techniques to negotiation of agreement proposals, rather than using them solely to negotiate proofs of security attributes.
The ATNAC framework is based on two well-established systems GAA-API (Ryutov and Neuman, 2002; Ryutov et al., 2003) and TrustBuilder (Winslett et al., 2002) . The GAA-API provides adaptive access control that captures dynamically changing system security requirements. The TrustBuilder system regulates when and how sensitive information is disclosed to other parties. The Analyzer maintains a separate SL for each requester based on the IP address and certificate-based identity (if available), and stores the information in a Suspicion Database. Analyzer dynamically calculates the SLs based on the information reported by the GAA-API and TrustBuilder.
This combination extends the capabilities of each system. In particular, the framework allows us to detect and thwart certain attacks on electronic transactions, to adapt information disclosure and resource access policies according to a level of suspicion.
We are extending the ATNAC to support the functions defined in Section 3. In particular, we are using the GAA-API to implement the fulfill() function that takes proposed and local expectations and obligations, and returns a decision whether the input fulfils the local requirements.
The TrustBuilder modules serve as a basis for implementing the attributerelease() and counteroffer() functions that control the sensitive attribute disclosure, building counter offers, and controlling the negotiation process according to the strategies expressed in the local policies. One of the challenges is mapping the local policies I, obligations, and expectations to the policy formats supported by the GAA-API (uses EACL format) and TrustBuilder (employs X.509v3 digital certificates and TPL policies).
The Analyzer module implements the updatesl() that monitors the interactions between members during the agreement negotiation, updates suspicion levels and detects suspicious behaviours and violations as they occur according to the policies I. Proper evidence is collected on both the actions and the lack of actions of the agents by observing the negotiation history H.
In the implementation, the SL may consist of several components that are related to different aspects of observed behaviour. For example, a participant repeatedly presents forged credentials or irrelevant credentials that were not requested by the other party, or a participant persistently tries to get the better shared profit by engaging in lengthy negotiations with little or no progress toward a mutually satisfactory outcome. In our current implementation, the SL is comprised of three components:
sl DoS indicates a probability of DoS attack on behalf of the requester. sl IL is attributed to sensitive information leakage attempts. Finely, sl O indicates other suspicious behaviours (e.g., misuses of a user's identity or impersonation attempts). All three values range from 0.0 to 1.0. The Analyzer (local to the participant) increases the SL with the occurring times of the suspicious event and decreases the SL when a 'positive' event happens (e.g., successful agreement negotiation and/or successfully completed business transaction). The value by which the SL is increased depends on the confidence level that the repeated events indicate malicious activity. For example, the Analyzer may increase a particular component of SL by 0.25, 0.25, 0.5 on the first, second and third consecutive errors.
We will extend the SL with additional components (and will design and implement the corresponding updatesl() functions) attributed to the 'lack of good will' and other suspicious behaviours observed during the agreement negotiation process. Zuo and Panda (2005) present a trust management model for maintaining trust levels within a VO. The levels can be dynamically updated to accommodate the dynamic nature of a VO. The model supports integration of partial trust values to evaluate the composite trust of a compound entity. Cahill et al. (2003) present SECURE -a general framework for trust and risk driven decision making. SECURE project focuses primarily on building trust infrastructures for large ad hoc wireless networks. SECURE utilises the risk and trust to determine whether an interaction can occur. Quirchmayr et al. (2002) describe an approach to modelling contract establishment in Virtual Enterprises based on the first order predicate logic formalism. VO's main concern is supporting enforceable contracts. This means that it is possible to determine whether the actions of parties are in accordance with the contract in effect. They do not consider notion of trust, negotiation techniques and policies. Damianou et al. (2001) developed annotation and tools for specifying, analysing and enforcing obligation and authorisation policies for managing large scale distributed systems.
Related work
PeerTrust (Nejdl et al., 2004 ) is a trust management system that uses a simple and expressive policy language based on distributed logic programs. PeerTrust agents perform automated trust negotiation to obtain access to sensitive resources. Bonatti and Samarati (2002) proposed a framework based on policy language and an interaction model for regulating access to network services. This trust establishment framework uses logical rules for accessing services and avoiding unnecessary disclosure of sensitive information.
Our work differs from the work cited above in the introduction of the concept of suspicion level and mutual trust effect of the participants behaviour during the trust negotiation process.
Conclusions and future work
We presented a framework supporting on-demand creation of trust relationships (or agreements) within the context of cross-institutional VOs. The trust formation process is based on:
• knowledge (third party information -recommendations, knowledge about entity's nature, such as competence, technical capabilities, and skills)
• behavioural aspects: signs of good will (not self-serving or opportunistic), cooperation and information sharing openness
• predictions of future behaviour based on observed interactions.
This framework can be used to implement a server that accepts VO creation proposals for a particular purpose from different organisations. The submission of a proposal initiates the goal verification and negotiation processes. As a result, either a VO agreement is created or the information about potential partners is returned. Future work includes specification of the exact structure of local policies I, statements and sanctions (that comprise expectations and obligations); extention of the framework to support multi-party negotiations; and investigation of whether the local policies I need to be updated dynamically to accommodate new user requirements and obligations imposed by expectations of the new members. endorsement of the funding agencies. Figures and descriptions were provided by the authors and are used with permission.
